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THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
GEORGE D. BRADENt
"We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can
never see them with any eyes except our own."
-CARDozo, The Nature of the Jud.cial Process
THi.s is an era of avowed sophistication in the Supreme Court. To
talk, as Justice Roberts did, of simply laying a statute alongside an
article of the Constitution to see if the former squares with the latter,'
now seems almost like dredging up an antiquity. Justices may always
have been sufficiently sophisticated to know that the judicial process
is not that simple, that in the constitutional field the process is pri-
marily political, not judicial; but it is only recently that they have
admitted as much and have begun to discuss publicly their methods
of deciding cases. 2
One can hardly blame the current bench for indulging in this sort of
self-analysis, so obviously designed to minimize the significance of
"personal predilections." 3 The Court was buffeted enough during the
storm over the Constitution 4 to make the boldest justice keep his neck
drawn in. Yet without some external measuring stick of predilection,
i.e., a substitute for "personal," no justice has any satisfactory way
to avoid either sticking his neck out or being a cipher. If he takes the
latter 'course, he will presumably feel thoroughly frustrated and, if
enough colleagues are of like mind, will be effectively helping to destroy
the Court's power. Instead, he may acknowledge the political power
he possesses and then go on to demonstrate that lie has chosen a par-
ticular course of action which will narrow the scope of this power. Here
the justice seems to be saying: "I admit that Justice Robert's mechan-
ical method of squaring the statute and the Constitution was nonsense.
Of course, we wield power. But this is potentially dangerous. There-
fore, we must create a rule which is sufficiently objective to circum-
scribe us and our successors in our exercise of political power."
I Assistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
2. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Rescue Army v. Munici-
pal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweher, 329 U.S. 459
(1947) ; West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
3. "It is difficult to imagine any grounds, other than our own personal economic
predilections, for saying that. . " Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 633 (1936).
4. See, e.g., BRANT, STORM OVER THE CONSTITUTION (1936); JAcxso:r, TinE SmnuG-
cGL roR JTuficLTA SupapmAmC (1941).
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Thus, the Supreme Court goes galloping off in search of objectivity.,
This approach is admittedly a far cry from the deceptiveness, self-
induced or not, of the mechanistic approach. But will it produce any-
thing any more satisfactory either to the justices themselves or to the
public?
THE PROBLEM
In the broad view of things, the Supreme Court deals on the con-
stitutional level with issues of absolute limitations on governmental
power, distribution of power in a federal system, and distribution of
power within the elements of the Federal Government. Such issues are
of the greatest significance to the people of the country. Into such
issues are packed political, economic, and social factors which cannot
be anything but decisive, or, if a qualification seems necessary, highly
persuasive. Thus the usual constitutional issue acquires non-legal over-
tones that set it off from most ordinary litigation.' The more insistent
the overtones the more difficult it is to confine the issue within legal
boundaries, the more necessary it is to rely on extraneous materials to
aid in decision.7 Furthermore, the nature of the wording of constitu-
tional provisions adds to this difficulty. Provisions run the gamut from
definite and precise-". . . each Senator shall have one vote," 8-to
semi-definite-"Congress shall make no law . ..abridging the free-
dom of speech," '-to hopelessly vague-"The Congress shall have
power .. .to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States. . . ." 10 The less definite the provision the more likely
it is to be litigated, the more likely are judges to quarrel over meaning
5. By objectivity I mean that quality of a rule of law which enables it to be applied to
similar situations with similar results regardless of the identity of the judges who apply it,
6. The analysis of the judging process herein discussed is limited to constitutional
issues in the Supreme Court. When it comes to statutory interpretation or common-law
adjudication, other factors enter which change the emphasis of factors herein discussed.
Likewise, lower federal courts and state court systems differ from the Supreme Court so
much that a completely new analysis would be necessary.
7. See generally Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme
Court, 50 YALE L. J. 1319, esp. pp. 1324-34 (1941). It has been said of this article that
it is "the source of one of the leading current doctrines of judicial review." Commont,
The Ivage in the Mirror, 56 YALE L. J. 1356, 1357 n.3 (1947). Assuming that this is a
compliment, I must hasten to protect myself, and perhaps by inference, Mr. Hamilton,
against a charge of inconsistency, for the implication in the quotation above is that we
propounded an "objective" theory of judicial review. Hence I point out first, that in
large measure the criterion of "competence" is a suggested philosophy for the Court on
the level of "procedural values", p. 577 infra; and second, that the concluding two para-
graphs of our article carefully noted that even if our criterion were accepted, it still left
"wide margins" for individual justices in furthering their "convictions of the 'Good So-
ciety.'" See pp. 1374-5.
8. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 3.
9. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. I.
10. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
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or to stray beyond the four corners of the document, and the more
likely that over a period of time different courts will read the provision
differently in the light of their own times. The upshot is that where
the Court usually acts, its freedom is greatest.
If the Court had to speak on every broad issue that came to it, it
might in the short run formulate a comprehensive constitutional phil-
osophy for its day. But it sits as a court of law and it has at hand a
wealth of techniques that enables it to broaden or narrow, resolve or
avoid, the constitutional issues brought before it. This compounds the
confusion. For example, the Court can make something "constitu-
tional" or "unconstitutional" without saying so," or it can assist or
hinder another arm of government without addressing itself to the
constitutional issue of distribution of power.'2
The Supreme Court starts, then, with a fundamental document, the
more important provisions of which are hopelessly vague. It is pre-
sented with momentous questions, but they come to it via a system
that is flexible enough to premit reshaping of the issues. To all this can
be added a century and a half of gloss wherein each generation inter-
preted the document to fit its environment. With the changes in ex-
ternal factors through the history of the country, the stock of interpre-
tations has become large and varied so that today the Court has almost
unlimited verbal devices for justifying anything it does. Small wonder
then, that individual justices search for ways to control themselves and
their brethren.
THE FREEDOM OF A JUSTIcE
Notwithstanding the present welter of confusion which gives the
Court such freedom of action, there are limiting factors. Before weigh-
ing the worth of the theories of self-limitation propounded by members
of the Court it is worthwhile to see what exists apart from any theory.
It is also well to examine this freedom against which so many theories
of self-limitation are set up. With these two pre-existing opposites set
forth, the new theories may be evaluated.
If one assumes for purposes of analysis the extremes of freedom pos-
11. E.g., the Illinois statute governing Congressional districts was "constitutional"
because the Court would not pass on the question. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946). The Civil Rights Act was construed narrowly to avoid grave constitutional
doubts; hence, the broader meaning is "unconstitutional." Screws v. United States, 325
U.S.91 (1945).
12. E.g., in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), the Court prevented
an attack on an administrative interpretation of a statutory delegation by the technical
finding of lack of standing to sue. In Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S.
101 (1944), the Court refused to pass on the validity of a state statute because the state
courts had not construed the statute. The issue was a tax assessed for the years 1937-40.
As of March 1948, the state case was pending before the Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors. Thus the state government continues to be in doubt.
1948]
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sessed by any majority of the Supreme Court, there are only four abso-
lute limitations on their power. First, a possible constitutional issue
must be brought before them. This is not meant in the sense of the
legal lore of "case or controversy" but in the literal sense of finding
one person who wishes to raise the issue. To put it absurdly, if no one
in the United States except five members of the Court wishes a course
of action interdicted on constitutional grounds, there is no way to do it.
If the five members simply issue a public statement under these as-
sumed conditions, presumably no one will pay any attention to it. As
a corollary to this, there must be an affirmative step threatened by
someone which is susceptible to invalidation. Five justices cannot arise
one day and announce that it is unconstitutional for Congress not to
appropriate a billion dollars for psychical research. They may arise and
speak, but they will go unheeded. 13 A second absolute limitation is the
probability of obedience. A majority of the Court will not follow a
course of action which they believe will openly and literally be flouted,
for by doing so they will be consciously destroying their effectiveness.
Thirdly, they will not follow a course of action which they believe will
lead to a successful court-packing or similar plan aimed at them. Fi-
nally, they will not follow a course of action which they believe will lead
to their impeachment.14
These are rather absurd limitations, but they are the only absolutes.
Any others are subject to intellectual, verbal, call it what you will,
manipulation in such a way as to provide some loophole for escape if
necessary. For example, there must by tradition be a "case or contro-
versy." If the Court feels strongly enough about a matter which some
one attempts to bring, it is possible either to squeeze the subject matter
into the concept of a "case or controversy," or, if necessary, to avoid
the concept by some such red herring as "It is not for this Court to deny
redress of this grievous wrong solely because the wrong cannot be set
forth in orthodox terms. The great protection of the Constitution will
not be vitiated by such stultifying legalisms."' 1 Similarly, the Court
can literally manipulate "standing to sue," stare decisis, "political"
questions, and all other procedural aspects of constitutional law.
13. In either case, the grounds for ignoring the Court would involve talk about "case
or controversy." Where a person seeks to get an issue litigated the Court can, as I
argue in the next paragraph, manipulate the concept of "case or controversy." But
where the Court speaks ex mero inotu, I see no way for it to avoid the restrictive concept.
14. The third and fourth limitations are perhaps spurious. The Court could denounce
a court-packing plan or an impeachment as unconstitutional. Thus the "absolutely ab-
solute" limitation becomes the second. Even here there is a qualification to be made. The
court might follow a course which they knew would be flouted by another arm of the
government because they wanted to create a dramatic situation for immediate political use
or for future judicial use. Cf. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9,487 (C.C.D.
'Md. 1861).,
15. Cf. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944).
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Obviously, the Court does not lightly manipulate these traditional
devices. There are other limitations on its freedom. These are of two
kinds: those which are self-imposed (except to the extent that they
are conditioned by the last three of the absolute limitations noted
above); and those which are aspects of the individual justice's person-
ality.
Of this latter group there is first the individual's intellectual capacity.
Freedom, as discussed here, rests upon an assumption of infinite in-
tellectual ability to spin out words to justify what is done, to present
action in a non-startling fashion, to forestall excessive criticism-in
short, to prevent the uninitiated from losing faith. Each individual
justice has capacity short of the infinite. The less the capacity, the
less the ability either to perceive the rhetorical techniques for doing
what is wanted or to use them confidently enough to succeed.
More important than intellectual capacity is the individual's intel-
lectual fortitude. Justices may be able to exercise considerable freedom
but they may lack the courage to do so. This lack of courage is, of
course, conditioned by other factors already discussed. Action may not
be taken because of a fear that it will lead to a destruction of the Court
-in other words, an anticipation of an absolute limitation. Or action
may not be taken because of lack of confidence in intellectual capacity.
It is enough to describe such courage or the lack of it as a shorthand
expression of an individual justice's appraisal of the chances of exer-
cising power and yet preserving that power for the future.2" To the
extent that his appraisal is erroneous, he is unnecessarily limiting his
own freedom.
Closely related to capacity and fortitude are other aspects of the
justice's personality which affect his freedom. For example, justices
may be sensitive to criticism which is far short of a threat to their power.
Another example is capacity for work. In some cases a great deal of
agility may be required to present a point of view, and the labor may
not be worth the candle or the time required may not be available. Or
there is inertia. If a justice does not feel strongly on a subject he may
follow the line of least resistance and uncritically rely on what has gone
before. 17
In considering these personality factors circumscribing a judge, it
must be noted that they operate in two ways. First, they are to some
extent absolute in that they control the judge regardless of his personal
16. In many instances, what appears to be lack of courage may in reality be an un-
usually strong acceptance of one of the self-imposed limitations discussed pp. 576-7 infra.
Cf. Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167 (1947).
17. A law clerk in a circuit court of appeals once told me that his judge asked him
to look up the "law" on a case under consideration. Upon learning that the precise issue
had been decided by another circuit, the judge said that he would simply follow the other
circuit and forget about the problem.
19481
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inclination. An extremely stupid man may not, for example, be able
to see his way around a precedent. Or an extremely busy man may not
have the time to work out a method of avoiding the obvious. Second,
and more to the point, these factors are relative in that their restrictive
effect is a measure of the importance of the issue involved. The more
important the issue to the judge, the less he will be restricted. Con-
versely, the more trivial the issue, the more likely he will lack "cour-
age," or be too "busy," or fear "criticism."
The final class of limitations consists of those which are self-imposed.
One of these is the urge for "consistency": presumably, the Supreme
Court wishes to be consistent both because consistency is intellectually
satisfying and because it is an important tenet of Anglo-American
jurisprudence. Though this be true, the fact remains that the Supreme
Court does not have to be consistent except to the extent that it be-
lieves the absolute limitations on its power will be called forth if it is
inconsistent, Furthermore, "consistency" is a slippery business. Two
given decisions are consistent or inconsistent only in terms of the larger
frame into which they are put. For example, two interstate commerce
tax cases may be consistent on a theory that a direct tax on an inter-
state "sale" is invalid; but they may be inconsistent on a theory that
interstate sales taxes are invalid only if there is a likelihood of multiple
taxation.'8 The degree of consistency may be principally a matter of
articulateness in explaining the theory of decision. Beyond this, it must
'be conceded that American judges seek to be consistent on some level.
And where the course of decision has been consistent over a long period
of time, the urge for consistency may outweigh the dislike for the course
of decision. 9
Another self-imposed limitation may be denominated "avoidance of
confusion." If the assumptions which have just been set out are cor-
rect, the Supreme Court possesses a broad freedom to do as it wishes
in constitutional cases. But in exercising that freedom it must not
create too much immediate confusion. It is the ultimate spokesman in
the judicial hierarchy and the lesser spokesmen must pay heed. If the
Supreme Court pursues policies which lesser spokesmen, using the same
techniques which the Supreme Court uses, can twist into opposites, the
Supreme Court vitiates its own influence. This may very well be the
most effective limitation on the Supreme Court's power. If the opinion
of the Court were significant only as a justification of the action taken
in the case before it, the entire range of verbal legerdemain might be
safely employed. Unfortunately, the Court's every word must be set
18. See the various opinions in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), 56 YAIX
L. J. 898 (1947), ai to whether the'Court was there consistent with a line of cases end-
ing with McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940). See Dunham,
Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 CoL. L. Rp. 211 (1947).
19. See generally Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORN. L. Q. 137 (1946).
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down with an eye to its meaning in the future in similar situations, in
analogous situations, even in irrelevant situations. The Supreme Court
knows how far it has gone and can safely decide whether to stay there.
It cannot be sure where it will be taken by others before it can call a
halt. Put another way, just as the Supreme Court can manipulate the
words of the Constitution, so lower courts, administrators, lawyers, and
others can manipulate the words of the Supreme Court.='  It might
almost be asserted that what makes the law tolerably consistent is not
adherence to the past but fear of over-committing the future.
The final limitation on the individual justice's freedom to be sug-
gested here as "self-imposed" is a hybrid in that it may be a limiting
factor or it may not. This is what may be called the "concept of the
judicial function." If a justice believes he should have no power it is
conceivable that he may put his belief into practice. On the other hand
if he believes that he should have great power, his freedom may be en-
hanced by a sort of auto-intoxication. But several caveats must be
entered. First, the word "believes" is stressed because it is important
to distinguish between belief and profession of belief. Nothing is easier
for a justice than to profess not to do that which he does. Second, a
justice's concept of the judicial function may simply be an expression
of his scheme of values-e.g., this is important, I must pass on it; that
is not important, ergo I have no power to pass on it. Third, it is a
limitation which is profoundly affected by all the limitations outlined
above. Any concept of the judicial function must include an appraisal
of the power one possesses and one's competence to exercise that power.
Finally, in so far as the concept of the judicial function is a limitation
over and above an appraisal of power possessed, it is easily changed.
It is of the essence of "self-imposedness."
These are all factors limiting the freedom which a justice in theory
enjoys, a freedom to reshape contemporary American society according
to his own scheme of values. In venerable legal tradition these values
may be divided into substantive and procedural. Substantive values
will probably consist of beliefs concerning strong unionism, abolition
of racial discrimination, curtailment of business monopolies, public
ownership of public utilities, socialized medicine, religious freedom, and
so forth. Procedural values will probably consist of beliefs concerning
democracy, republicanism, federalism, states' rights, centralization of
20. It has seemed to me that Judge Learned Hand has on occasion said to himself
that the Supreme Court was going too far along some line and undertaken to prove it
by an almost absurd e-trapolation which the Court has had to reverse, thereby proving
his point. See United States ex rcl. McCann v. Adams, 126 F2d 774 (C.C.A. 2d 1942),
rev'd, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), and United States cx rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811
(C.C.A. 2d 1946) rev'd sub nor. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947). See also his
comments about the Dobsom rule in Brooklyn Nat. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450
(C.C.A. 2d 1946) and in Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner 155 F.2d 23 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
1948]
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power, rule by executive power, preservation of checks and balances,
and so forth. In addition, there may be more abstract and vague values
such as fair play, dignity of the individual, and even justice.
Once those values are set forth, their interaction must be considered.
A justice may favor private control of public utilities but he may be-
lieve in democracy so strongly that he will not attempt to protect
utilities from legislative control. Or a justice may wish to support re-
ligious freedom but may believe in state's rights so strongly that he
will let individual states tamper with it. These relationships will, to
some extent, be altered by the degree of intensity with which each be-
lief is held, so that interaction -may produce different results in different
instances. For example, religious freedom may be important enough
to outweigh legislative support of patriotism by flag salutes but not
to outweigh legislative protection from excessive ringing of doorbells.
Moreover, an individual may abstractly favor one course of action
except when he sees that furthering it affords protection to a disfavored
course of action. For example, a justice may deplore certain searches
and seizures, but he will not fight them too hard for fear that business
will seek shelter behind such a shield and effectively forestall certain
types of governmental economic regulation.
What is the situation facing the individual justice if his scheme of
values and the limitations on his freedom are brought together in the
context of a constitutional issue? Clearly there is an interaction of
three variables. First, the constitutional provision involved may be
definite or vague, the posture of the case clear-cut or fuzzy. For ex-
ample, Congress said in 1940 that for purposes of diversity of citizen-
ship jurisdiction, citizens of the District of Columbia should be eligible
to sue or to be sued in Federal courts. 21 But the Constitution says in
this context that jurisdiction shall extend only to controversies between
"citizens of different States." 22 It is simple to decide that the juris-
dictional grant is unconstitutional. 21 To decide otherwise requires con-
siderable spinning out of sophisticated argument. Second, the justice
has a scheme of values. He may feel that in this case Congress ought
to be allowed free rein in setting the rules for jurisdiction, or he may
dislike diversity jurisdiction. He may feel strongly about the general
"orphan" status of Washingtonians, or he may feel that corporations
"unfairly" benefit from diversity jurisdiction and may believe that
21. 54 STAT. 143,28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940).
22. U.S. CoNsT., Art. III, § 2.
23. The provision was held unconstitutional in Feely V. Schupper Interstate Hauling
System, 72 F. Supp. 663 (D. Md. 1947) ; Ostrow v. Samuel Brilliant Co., 66 F. Supp. 593
(D. Mass. 1946) ; Behlert v. James Foundation, 60 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) ; and
McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Contra: Glaeser v.
Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1944); Winkler v. Daniels, 43 F.
Supp. 265 (E.D. Va. 1942).
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the Congressional grant would increase these "unfair" corporate bene-
fits.2 4 Third, various limiting factors affect him. He will be aware that
this is not a political hot potato, that it is peculiarly a "judicial" ques-
tion, and that whatever is decided will probably be free from confusion,
at least in the sense that lower courts will not be able to twist things
around. But he will be aware also that there is considerable judicial
lore about "constitutional" courts and "legislative" courts in the Dis-
trict which might require extensive juggling if consistency is to be
preserved. 25 Putting all this together, if the justice wants to uphold
the Congressional grant he can do so without fear but not without
considerable work. In this instance, then, the work involved can be
set against the importance of upholding the grant of jurisdiction. Other
examples will produce different key factors, but no matter how the fac-
tors are set up and evaluated, the justice, must end by deciding how
important the issue is within his total scheme of values. And if the
issue is important enough nothing will stop him except the absolute
limitations on his power.
A justice may therefore do one of two things. He may admit to him-
self that he decides constitutional questions in the light of his own
scheme of values and then expound these values for all to see. Or the
justice may deny this concept of freedom and personal values and
assert that his decisions are based entirely and objectively on external
factors. Nhichever course is followed, the question is: how impregnable
can the justice make his position? If his is a philosophy of personal
freedom, can it be set up so that in the future it is self-executing? If
on the other hand his philosophy is one of external considerations, can
a third person look at his external scheme and find the same answer?
EFFORTS AT SELF-LIMITATION
One of the first of recent efforts by justices to make explicit a philos-
ophy of self-limitation appeared in Chief Justice Stone's now famous
footnote in the otherwise little noticed Carolene Producls case. -! He was
there addressing himself to a problem arising out of the use of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality as a means of forestalling Due Process
Clause attacks on economic legislation. His problem was to make the
24. See generally MfcGovney, . Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HAs. L. Rav. 853,
1090, 1225 (1943).
25. The Court, having differentiated the District of Columbia from the rest of the
country and thus created a concept of "legislative" courts differing from "constitutional"
courts under Article III, could be plagued with such a differentiation if it sought to
assert that the District was no different from a "state" as used in Article III. The prin-
cipal cases are Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930) ; Keller
v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); cf. O'Donoghue v. United States,
289 U.S. 516 (1933).
26. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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presumption stick in economic cases without being plagued by it in
civil liberties and similar cases. Accordingly, he suggested by typical
judicial indirection that legislation restricting political processes and
legislation directed at "discrete and insular" minorities should not have
a favorable presumption of constitutionality to protect the legislation
against attack.27 His expressed reason for the latter half of this was
that political processes "can ordinarily be expected to bring about re-
peal of undesirable legislation," but that minorities such as racial and
religious groups are subject to prejudice "which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities. . . .'2'
Chief Justice Stone's thesis appears to be something like this: "I am
first of all a man of reason. I believe in reason and its power in the mar-
ket place of discourse. I am also a democrat. I believe that our govern-
27. Id. at 152-3, n.4.
28. Ibid. This now famous footnote is not without its ambiguity. There are three para-
graphs to it. The second deals with restrictions on political process and the third deals
with minorities. The first paragraph appears to be unnecessary, if not actually inconsistent
with the remainder of the footnote. This paragraph argues that "there may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments. . . " Such an argument either obviates the necessity for speaking, as the
second paragraph does, of restrictions on political processes if the First and Fifteenth
Amendments cover political processes, or is not exhaustive if non-specific prohibitions
must be relied on to protect political processes. Likewise, the third paragraph on minori-
ties is potentially more extensive than any specific prohibitions contained in the Corlstitu-
tion. (Cf. p. 591 infra, as to "equal protection.")
I am forced to conclude either that Mr. Justice Stone was setting forth confusing
arguments or that he did not write the first paragraph. I incline to the second alternative
partly because the paragraph does not fit in with what appears to be his philosophy and
partly because two dicta are referred to to support the first paragraph, Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938),
both opinions of Chief Justice Hughes, which references seem only vaguely relevant,
Both references say that the legislation there under review is invalid on its face. There
is no hint that any fundamental constitutional theory is set forth. Furthermore, I should
think that legislation not within a "specific" prohibition of the Constitution could still
"appear on its face" to be invalid and would be so declared, as for example, an act of
Congress purporting to regulate "commerce not interstate or affecting such," or a state
statute which purported to take property from A and give it to B simply because the leg-
islators disliked A. (Cf. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1878)). My guess
is that Chief Justice Hughes added the paragraph to protect some theory he had which he
thought the citations to his opinions demonstrated.
If I am right, it is unfortunate that the first paragraph got carried along as part of
Chief Justice Stone's philosophy. See KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SU-
PREME COURT, 195 (1945) ; Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 Col. L. Rev, 764,
795-6 (1946) ; cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Vest Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943), wherein he cites the footnote to support the Court's recognition
that the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights are specific. But see Lusky, Minority Rights
and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 1, 20 (1942), where the footnote is quoted in full
except that the first paragraph is omitted.
[Vol. 57.:571
OBJECTIVITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW1
ments are to be run by the governed. Therefore I shall use my great
power as a Supreme Court justice sparingly, but I shall use it when it
is necessary to preserve the democratic process or to protect those in-
jured by unreason under circumstances where politiCal processes cannot
be relied on to protect them."
Shortly before the Carolene Prodicts case he expressed much this
same notion as a guide in umpiring the Commerce Clause.! He first
noted that the Court had frequently struck down state legislation af-
fecting interstate commerce where the purpose was to benefit the local
citizens at the expense of the outlander. Then he expressed the thought
"that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls
principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely
to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted
on legislation where it affects adversely some interest within the tate."*O
Here then is a statement of a basic formula for constitutional deci-
sions in certain areas. It is not a statement which can be found in the
Constitution or in the Court's gloss on the Constitution. It is rather
one man's explanation of why he finds the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses to be limitations on government in some instances and not in
others. Put another way, it is simply a part of one man's set of values
for his society which he holds strongly enough to be willing to enforce
when the opportunity arises.
An analysis of this philosophy reveals some shortcomings. In the
first place, it is open-ended. What are "discrete and insular minorities"?
Racial and religious groups, yes. Public utilities? Had Chief Justice
Stone sat on the Court in the days of Granger legislation against the
railroads, would he have held the railroads to be such a minority? 3, In
the second place, such a philosophy based on reason may work in re-
verse in that a justice unable to see any validity in any argument ad-
vanced in support of a legislative act may conclude that it is irrational
legislation and hence aimed at a "minority." Third, it is not a complete
blueprint. It says that delicate weighing is required when the legisla-
tive assertion of necessity is attacked in the name of protection of
political processes or of minorities, but it does not give the balance
point on the scales. True, no man can anticipate the minor premises
that will be brought to him. A working philosophy can not be com-
pletely blueprinted; it must grow by experience. But Chief Justice
Stone's philosophy is so abstract that it contains virtually nothing to
show how it works in individual cases. Would he have dissented in
29. South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-5, n2 (1938).
30. Ibid. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), where he appears
to have modified, if not abandoned, this view.
31. See 2 VARREx, THE SUPREIr CouRT Iw Uxrw-n STATEs Hisany, 574-95 (2d
ed. 1928).
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Colegrove v. Green,32 where the Court refused to remedy unbalanced
representation in Congress? With regard to minorities, did he scruti-
nize severely "legislation directed at" or "legislation affecting" minor-
ities? Did he require some objective mark of minority status, such as
color, to bring his philosophy into effective operations? 11
This is not an objective theory of judicial review. The Chief Justice
never claimed that it was. A man who said "the only check upon our
own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint" 14 could hardly
believe in any self-executing objective standard of constitutionality.
It is perhaps unfair to set forth his thesis as an example of the effort to
catch the will-o'-the-wisp of objectivity, but it does seem appropriate
to present it as an early attempt to do the next best thing--i.e., to
make an open declaration of personal beliefs. Chief Justice Stone may
not haVe stricken out the "personal" in "personal predilection"; he
did evolve a well-considered personal philosophy of self-limitation and
present it for public criticism as such.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has likewise come forth with a well-con-
sidered philosophy of judicial restraint in areas of limitations on govern-
ment, but he departs from Chief Justice Stone in presenting his as ob-
jective and impersonal. His starting point is the necessity for judicial
self-restraint, especially when deciding constitutional questions of
limitations on government as in the case of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.35 He is apparently prepared to accept as a minimum of power
the protection of political processes, the first half of Chief Justice
Stone's thesis. In his exhaustive statement of his creed in the second
flag salute case, he notes that the "channels of affirmative free expres-
sion" were open to the Jehovah's Witnesses, the opponents of compul-
sory flag saluting.36 "Had we before us any act of the state putting the
slightest curbs upon such free expression, I should not lag behind any
member of this Court in striking down such an invasion of the right
to freedom of thought and freedom of speech protected by the Consti-
tution." 31 Inasmuch as the Fourteenth'Amendment, under which the
flag salute case was brought, says nothing about freedom of thought
32. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
33. See Lusky, supra note 28, at 28-30, where it is suggested that Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), might be distinguished from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
because the latter involved Negroes, the former, a white man. The analysis may be ac-
curate as to Chief Justice Stone's vote. The subsequent confusion in the denial of counsel
cases indicates that color is not decisive. Compare,, e.g., the successful attack in Do
Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (white man semble), with the unsuccessful
attack in Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) (Negro).
34. Dissenting in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936).
35. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647-8 (1943).
36. Id. at 664.
37. Ibid.
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or speech, Mr. Justice Frankfurter must have some reason for reading
such freedom into the Due Process Clause. That his reason apparently
is much the same as the Chief Justice's is fairly inferred from these
quoted statements and from his concluding words in his opinion for
the Court in the first flag salute case.3 There he exalts the role of the
legislature, provided that "all the effective means of inducing political
changes are left free from interference." '
It is equally apparent that Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not accept
Chief Justice Stone's protection of minorities. The fact that the two
men opposed each other in both flag salute cases is enough in itself
to establish this. If Mr. Justice Frankfurter stopped with his
thesis in those two cases it might be possible to state that he has a per-
sonal philosophy even narrower than that of Chief Justice Stone, pos-
sessing the best qualities of the latter's without some of the shortcom-
ings noted above.40 But he does not stop there. He casts his theory in
such a way as to make it objective. First, he makes reference to "spe-
cific" prohibitions in the Constitution, using as an example the Bill
of Rights, adding that each is as important as the next one. 41 Inasmuch
as the First Amendment protects political processes,42 he could rely on
this "specific" provision were it not for the problem of getting the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth. He is not willing to import all the
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth, 3 and must therefore provide a basis
for discriminating between parts of the Bill of Rights, rejecting some
and accepting others for purposes of enforcing the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is in setting forth the criterion for
discrimination that his objective theory takes shape.
This objective criterion is most frequently expressed in words of Mr.
Justice Cardozo. For example, on one occasion Mr. Justice Frankfurter
relies on his predecessor's words when he says, "We are dealing with
principles of liberty and justice 'so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental'--something with-
out which 'a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impos-
sible.' " 44 Again he says, "insofar as due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the States to observe any of the immunities 'that
38. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).
39. Ibid.
40. See p. 581 supra.
41. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943).
42. In part, that is. The Fifteenth Amendment is also relewant.
43. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59-68 (1947), for his latest statement.
I do not mean to imply that were he to take the Bill of rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment he would have an objective theory. See pp. 589-93 infra, for the discussion of
Mr. Justice Black's attempt to solve the problem in such a manner.
44. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943), quoting from
Snyder v. Mfassachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937). Mir. Justice Frankfurter credits only the Palto case but an examina-
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are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific
pledges of particular amendments' it does so because they 'have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through
the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the States.' " 46
On occasion he quotes from others, 46 and sometimes phrases the cri-
terion in his own words. 47 It all adds up to fundamental notions of
justice and liberty.
The important point, of course, is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's assertion
that these are not his fundamental notions. In the Willie Francis case,
he says, in a concurring opinion, "We cannot escape acknowledging that
[the problem before us) involves the application of standards of fairness
and justice very broadly conceived. They are not the application of
merely personal standards but the impersonal standards of society
which alone judges, as the organs of Law, are empowered to enforce."4"
And again in the same opinion he says, "I cannot rid myself of the con-
viction that were I to hold that Louisiana would transgress the Due
Process Clause if the State were allowed in the precise circumstances
before us, to carry out the death sentence, I would be enforcing my
private view rather than that consensus of society's opinion which, for
purposes of due process, is the standard enjoined by the Constitution.""9
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's thesis would thus appear to be somewhat
as follows: "I do not let any personal views of my own govern my deci-
sions. I decide cases only on the basis of the consensus of society's
opinion of what are fundamental standards of fair play and justice.
Naturally, I must have a constitutional provision through which this
consensus of opinion can express itself."
Many questions come to mind at once. What is this consensus? Is
it qualitative or quantitative? Is it nationwide or broken into statewide
tion of the opinion discloses that Mr. Justice Cardozo was in part quoting from his own
opinion in the Snyder case.
45. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468-9 (1947), quoting from
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-5 (1937).
46. In his concurring opinion in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
470 (1947), he says: "When the standards for judicial judgment are not narrower than
'immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government,' Holden
v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 [ (1898)], 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,' Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 [(1926)], ...great tolerance toward a State's conduct is demanded of this
Court." Mr. Justice Brown was the spokesman in the Holden case, Mr. Justice Van-
Devanter, in the Hebert case.
47. See text quotations accompanying notes 48 and 49 infra. See also Haley v. State,
68 Sup. Ct. 302 (1948) where he concurs specially, reiterating his thesis and adding to it
by noting that he personally does not believe in capital punishment or in the use of con-
ventional criminal process where fifteen-year-old offenders are involved, but would not
in the name of due process of law impose such personal beliefs on the states. Id. at 305.
48. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947).
49. Id. at 471.
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segments? If nationwide, is it determined by a majority of states or
a majority of people? What is it a consensus of? Abstract notions of
fair play and justice? Or an opinion on the third degree, or flag-saluting,
or racial segregation? Or an opinion on the given, case before the Court?
And how does a justice, who knows what he is looking for, find it? By
a Gallup Poll? By editorials in leading papers? By the number of com-
mittees of substantial citizens who support the notion? By the number
of briefs amici curiae filed? By the number of states which follow a
given course? Mr. Justice Frankfurter has given little indication of his
answers to these questions.
It is, of course, obvious that he must start with constitutional pro-
visions. The Fourteenth Amendment says that "No state shall. ...",9
One would think that this implied a national prohibition against some-
thing and thus that the consensus of opinion on fundamental justice
would be nationwide. But Mr. Justice Frankfurter appears not to ac-
cept this initial determination of the nature of his consensus. In trying
to explain that disagreement among his brethren "is not disproof that
general rather than idiosyncratic standards are applied," he says: "An
important safeguard against such merely individual judgment is an
alert deference to the judgment of the State Court under reviewv." 51
This may mean that he thinks that state judges are peculiarly well
equipped to ascertain the consensus of society's opinion. Such an in-
terpretation of his words would imply that provincial judges are more
discerning in their scrutiny of the national scene than are national
judges. If this were his belief, he would effectively destroy his own job.
Another possible interpretation of his words is that he believes that
the consensus of society's opinion is found by ascertaining the consensus
of judges' opinions of what they think is the consensus of society's
opinion. But this presupposes that any other judge who has thought
about the matter under review used the same formula of objectivity
that Mr. Justice Frankfurter uses. It hardly seems likely that he would
vitiate his search for fundamental justice by accepting a consensus of
the opinions of judges of whom some may have had "idiosyncratic"
notions of justice.
The most obvious interpretation of his words is that he thinks funda-
mental notions of justice are compartmentalized within state bound-
aries. Other statements of his might lend support to this. For example,
in a context of contrast between federal criminal justice and state
criminal justice he once said, "Review by this Court of state action
expressing its notion of what will best further its own security in the
administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the
50. U.S. CoNsT. AmrEND. XIV, § 1.
51. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (concurring opinion); the same
language appears in his concurring opinion in Mfalinski v. New York 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945).
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deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdic-
tion." 52 Unfortunately, this interpretation falls to pieces because he
sometimes votes against state judges.53 In one such case, he made the
same remark about "deference" quoted above 5 4 and then immediately
added, "but there cannot be blind acceptance even of such weighty
judgment without disregarding the historic function of civilized pro-
cedure in the progress of liberty." 51
Thus the consensus cannot be national, else there is little reason for
deferring to a state court, but by the same token it is not state-enclosed,
else blind acceptance must be given. What is it? Perhaps one counts
individual state judgments. This theory might be substantiated by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's use in a federal searches and seizures case of the
significance of a similar provision in the constitutions of all 48 states."
On the other hand there were apparently only 18 states that required a
compulsory flag salute when he first wrote on that issue. 7 But then
perhaps negative votes cannot be counted, for if they can be he should
have voted against the legislation. In any event, he has no more clearly
indicated that he uses this as a counting device than he has indicated
whether a national or state consensus is involved.
This discussion of national or statewide consensus of society's opinion
as to fundamental justice is pertinent in relation to the Fourteenth
Amendment and state governmental activity. With reference to the
Bill of Rights and national governmental activity the situation is
changed. Here Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not appear to rely on the
consensus of society's opinion. This may be either because he believes
the very existence of the Bill of Rights is per se an objective manifesta-
tion of the consensus or because he believes that he must enforce the
Bill of Rights regardless of society's opinion. If the first reason is cor-
rect, he has accepted a national consensus as to the Federal Govern-
ment which is not the same as the consensus as to states..
If the second reason is correct, his objective standard becomes con-
fused indeed. He seems to be saying that he will use the consensus of
society's opinion only when he has a vague constitutional provision,
such as the Due Process Clause, before him. But if, as he says, the
justices are "set apart" in order "to take a view of longer range" than
52. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
53. E.g., in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (dissenting); Dc-
Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, (1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
54. See text quotation accompanying note 51 mpra.
55. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945).
56. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 160 (1947) (dissenting).
57. "Eighteen big states have seen fit to exert their power over a small number of
little children ('and forbid them not')." Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d
683 (C.C.A. 3d 1939).
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that of legislators and administrators,33 one would think that he would
attempt to soften archaic specific restrictions in the Bill of Rights which
"grew out of transient ecperience or formulated remedies which time
might well improve" 11 by reliance on the consensus of society's opinion
of fundamental justice.
Which of the two reasons is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's is none too
clear. On one occasion he said that his "power does not vary according
to the particular provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked ...
In no instance is this Court the primary protector of the particular
liberty invoked." 60 This seems to mean that so far as the Federal
Government is concerned the Bill of Rights hits equally hard in all
respects regardless of society's opinion of fundamental justice. Yet
when dissenting from a decision not applying the Fourth Amendment's
unreasonable searches and seizures prohibition, he said, after conceding
the importance of "stern enforcement of the criminal law": "But in
our democracy such enforcement presupposes a moral atmosphere and
a reliance upon intelligence whereby the effective administration of
justice can be achieved with due regard for those civilized standards
in the use of the criminal law which are formulated in our Bill of
Rights." 61 Are "civilized standards" the same in the Bill of Rights
as they are in the Fourteenth Amendment? If they are not, then it is
clear why Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not indicate from what society
he obtains a consensus of opinion: he does not because there is no one
society. If the "civilized standards" are the same, then his language is
defective and the end of the sentence should read "those civilized
standards in the use of the criminal law which are formulated in our
Bill of Rights along with some archaic junk that is not necessary but
must be enforced because it is included." 62
If all of his distinctions between the Bill of Rights as it applies to the
Federal Government and as it applies through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are put together they can be reconciled. But not by reference to
any consensus of society's opinion of fundamental justice. The recon-
ciling factor is states' rights. A man who strongly believes in leaving
the citizens of individual states free to work out their own problems
and to preserve their own liberties would defer to state judges but not
to lower federal judges, would enforce the Federal Bill of Rights strictly
but would not carry it into the Fourteenth Amendment in too. And
58. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 665 (1943).
59. Louisiana ex re. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468 (1947).
60. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943).
61. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 615 (1946).
62. There is also the "alert deference" he accords to the state court below, but does
not accord to lower federal courts. Or at least I have not found any such "deference."
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter has indicated independently of this type of
case his belief in the importance of states' rights.3
The trouble with this states' rights factor is that it plays havoc with
his objective standard for determination of constitutionality of govern-
mental activity. It is difficult to believe that society has evolved so
intricate a theory as to hold that the "concept of ordered liberty"
is influenced by the existence of a federal system. And it is even more
difficult to postulate a consensus of society's opinion that matches Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's combination of states' rights and protection of
civil liberties. He will allow states freedom to experiment with admin-
istration of criminal justice, but not with freedom of speech; 64 to ex-
periment with flag-saluting, but not with free bus service for parochial
schools.6 5 Conceivably, society might have such a consensus in the
abstract; it seems inconceivable that society would get there by the use
of a concept of states' rights.
Aside from all these theoretical difficulties with Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's objective standard, there is the practical problem of applying
it to concrete cases. That he is aware of this is clear from his acknowl-
edgement that "judges among themselves may differ," and his belief
that "alert deference to the judgment of the State court under review"
will keep the differences under control.66 He has said this cannot be
"blind acceptance." 67 He must, therefore, be saying that even though
judges can agree on what is society's opinion, he reserves the privilege
of applying it his way. But he cannot do that except by his own view
of how best to enforce the objective rules he finds. By "the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion," 68 he will clothe society's
abstraction with reality. The reality is his, not society's.
It seems fair to conclude that Mr. Justice Frankfurter has postulated
an objective standard of constitutionality that breaks down upon dis-
section. What, then, has Mr. Justice Frankfurter propounded? This
is no simple matter, for it requires assertions as to what he really thinks
as opposed to what he says. But tentatively, it can be argued that his
objective standard is a way of expressing tvo things: his own set of
63. See, e.g., his dissents in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 238
(1947), Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York SLRB, 330 U.S. 767, 777 (1947), First Iowa
Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 183 (1946), and Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v.
Dept. of Agriculture of Calif., 318 U.S. 285, 296 (1943). And see Kirschbaum Co. v.
Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 521-3 (1942), and FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 351, 355
(1941), 50 YAI. L.J. 1294 (1941).
64. Compare discussion pp. 585-6 snpra, with discussion p. 582 supra.
65. Compare Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) with Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (dissenting).
66. See text quotation accompanying note 51 supra.
67. See text quotation accompanying note 55 sipra.
68. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877), quoted by Justice Frank-
furter in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947).
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values for his society and his own conception of the safe limits of his
function. Some things he believes in strongly enough to use his power
to protect them.69 Others he may believe in but not strongly enough
to risk the charge of abuse of office. These are not all the factors to be
taken into account. Justices are not such uncomplicated mechanisms. 0
But these are certainly two key factors which are more significant than
his own words about the "impersonal standards of society which alone
judges, as the organs of Law, are empowered to enforce." -I
Mr. Justice Black also searches for an "impersonal standard" by
which he can decide issues of constitutional limitations on government.
But his method is the antithesis of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's. In Adam-
son v. California ,7 2 they both staged a full-dress review of their theories.
Mr. Justice Black rejects the "consensus of society's opinion" theory,
which he calls a "natural law" theory,73 for two reasons. First, he be-
lieves in the Bill of Rights and feels that "to hold that this Court can
determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced
[under the Fourteenth Amendment], and if so to what degree, is to
frustrate the great design of a written Constitution." 74 Second, he
69. "Without a free press there can be no free society." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 354 (1946) (concurring).
70. I suppose someone might argue, for example, that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
is overly influenced by the English. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 171
(1947), Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 359 (1946), Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 419 (1945), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
71. See te-xt quotation accompanying note 48 supra. Of course, if Mr. Justice Frank-
furter postulates a monistic theory of the state, in the nature of the Oxford idealism of
Bosanquet, then he presumably is striving to make his decisions accord with the "real
will" of society. See BOSANQTrET, THE PHOSoPHICam TnEoRY OF TIM STATE 138-43,
215-6 (3d ed. 1920). But there are difficulties with this. In the first place, the adoption
of such a theory is in itself a choice of a philosophy. Decisions would then be according
to hIris "subjective philosophy." In the second place, decisions based on such a philosophy
imply either that he thinks his ideas better approach the "real will" than do his brethren's,
in which case they remain his ideas; or that he adheres to the absolute idealistic notion
wherein his ideas are a "reflection" of the "real will," in which case his brethren's ideas
are also "reflections" of the same "real will." Finally, "if this means that social life is
ultimately the product of a single and rational mind organizing its activities in terms of
a logical process, it is contrary to every fact we encounter in daily experience." LAsm,
A GRAmmAR OF PoLrIncs 34 (1925). See also LASK Tn STATE nz TuTon- AND PnAc-
TicE 36-46 (1935). Obviously, I do not maintain that Mr. Justice Frankfurter sub-
scribes to Oxford idealism. I mention the possibility only because it seems to me one
philosophical basis for his decisions by "impersonal standards of society" which would
produce a form of objectivity. If this is the form of his objectivity, I think it infirm for the
reasons above. If he does not accept the "real will" theory, then I revert to the argument
in the text
72. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
73. Id. at 69. See also his objections to "natural law" in International Shoe Co.
v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324-6 (1945) (separate opinion).
74. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947).
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feels that "this formula also has been used in the past and can be used
in the future, to license this Court, in considering regulatory legislation,
to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and to tres-
pass, all too freely, on the legislative domain of the states as well as
the Federal Government." 75
Mr. Justice Black's thesis is that he enforces the Bill of Rights be-
cause that is what the Constitution specifically provides for. He further
asserts that a study of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment con-
vinces him that the Bill of Rights was carried into the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, he asserts an objective standard of constitution-
ality covering both state and national government.
Many technical difficulties have to be surmounted by Mr. Justice
Black before he can defend his thesis as an objective standard. Whether
his history is accurate is a question of importance that need not be
dealt with here. Even if he were wrong, he could still defend his theory
by a logical imputation to the states of a national standard of prohibi-
tions of which the Bill of Rights could be considered the best evidence.
Nor need he be disturbed by the logical by-play that "due process"
cannot mean one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another thing in
the Fourteenth." He can, and doe§, answer this with a similar bit of
by-play to the effect that "the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment's first section, separately, and as a whole," incorporate the Bill
of Rights.' Thus he does not rely on "privileges and immunities" or
on "due process." He relies on the Fourteenth Amendment.
What apparently does cause him trouble is the argument that he
could hardly want to be so literal as to insist on every prohibition in
the Bill of Rights. The argument is put thus: "Even the boldest in-
novator would shrink from suggesting to more than half the States
that they no longer initiate prosecutions without indictment by grand
jury, or that thereafter all the States of the Union must furnish a jury
of twelve for every case involving a claim above twenty dollars," 11
Mr. Justice Black appears to hedge against such a literal transference
when he says, "Whether this Court ever will, or whether it now should,
in the light of past decisions, give full effect to what the [Fourteenth]
Amendment was intended to accomplish is not necessarily essential to
a decision here." 80 To the extent that he means this hedge to be effec-
75. Id. at 90.
76. My a priori guess is that a great deal of historical research will produce the same
inconclusive story that has come out of the controversy over the conspiracy theory. See
Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Anmendncnt, 47 YALE L.J. 371
(1938), 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938).
77. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's conburring opinion in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 59 (1947), for the argument.
78. Id. at 71.
79. Id. at 64-5. This is from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion.
80. Id. at 75.
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tive, his thesis differs not one whit from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's.
They both put into the Fourteenth Amendment what they want to.
Mr. Justice Black's thesis has still other loopholes. First, he may not
find in the Bill of Rights "specific" protection for everything he may
want to protect. For example, there is no equal protection clause in the
Bill of Rights. Would he deny equal protection where national action
was in question? Or would he read equal protection backwards from
the Fourteenth into the Fifth? What "specific" provision other than
equal protection could he find that would forbid racial discrimination?
Second, he may have to twist "specific" provisions in order to get under
them when reliance on "due process" would be simpler. For example,
in Tot v. United States,"' a Congressional statutory presumption was
invalidated for lack of due process in that the presumed fact had no
"reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them." 82
Mr. Justice Black concurred but apparently relied on the Sixth Amend-
ment, which requires a public trial, and confronting an accused with
the witnesses against him."3 He also implied that the Sixth Amend-
ment requires "where guilt is in issue, . . . the introduction of some
evidence which tends to prove the elements of the crime charged." "I
A "fair trial" under the Sixth Amendment presumably implies reason-
able presumptions, but it seems a little unnecessary to build such a
structure just to avoid the use of "due process" language.
In theory Mr. Justice Black's thesis is objective in that he cannot go
outside the "specific" prohibitions of the Bill of Rights and herein it
differs from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's thesis inasmuch as the "consen-
sus of society's opinion" is not a definite and unchanging catalog which
can be observed by a third person. As a practical matter the two can
arrive at the same result. For example, Willie Francis was not pro-
tected from electrocution after an initial failure.85 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said this was because the "consensus of society's opinion" would
not protect Willie.85 Mr. Justice Black presumably thought Willie was
not twice put in jeopardy or subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment.Y 1hether the Bill of Rights was in or out of the Fourteenth
81. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
82. Id. at 468.
83. U.S. CoNsT. AAMEND. VI.
84. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 473 (1943). Mr. Justice Douglas concurred
with Mr. Justice Black.
85. Louisiana ex reL. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
86. Id. at 471.
87. I say "presumably" because Mr. Justice Black silently concurred in Mr. Justice
Reed's somewhat murky opinion. Mr. Justice Reed said that he would assume that pro-
hibitions against double jeopardy and cruel punishment were forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment. But his demonstration sounds more like a simple conclusion that Willie
was not denied "due process." It may be that I am reading by hindsight because in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), Mr. Justice Reed spoke for the Court and
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Amendment was of no significance in deciding Willie's fate. Both
agreed in Malinski v. New York s on the need for a new trial, one be-
cause the Bill of Rights "commanded" it, the other because society
"commanded" it. Furthermore, as a practical matter, society can
"command" invalidation of state action when the Bill of Rights does
not,89 or society can protect state action when the Bill of Rights
"commands" invalidation."
These two "objective" approaches both appear, therefore, to be suf-
ficiently subjective that there is little value in choosing between them.
Yet there is something to be said for preferring Mr. Justice Black's
approach. In the first place, he has, somewhat like Chief Justice Stone,
set forth- his personal philosophy of absolute limitations on government
as such even though he tries to put it in a frame~vork of objectivity.
"In my judgment," he says, "the people of no nation can lose their
liberty so long as a Bill of Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes
are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and respected so as to afford
continuous protection against old, as well as new, devices and practices
which might thwart those purposes." "1 He further concedes that since
he interprets the Bill of Rights ". . . and since words can have many
meanings, interpretation obviously may result in contraction or exten-
sion of the original purpose of a constitutional provision thereby affect-
ing policy." 92 The fair inference is that he will seek to further this
philosophy of his which he has set forth. The "natural law" approach,
on the other hand, gives no advance notice of what fundamental philos-
ophy is at work.
In the second place, Mr. Justice Black's approach is more conducive
to "judicial self-restraint" than is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's. As noted
earlier, "self-restraint" is easily turned on or off.9 Nevertheless, by
attempting to confine himself within "specific" words, Mr. Justice
Black makes his task harder, which tends to curtail judicial free-wheel-
ing. By contrast, there is no brake on spinning out a demonstration of
the "consensus of society's opinion". This is not to imply that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter exercises less self-restraint than Mr. Justice Black.
In the realm of civil liberties, Mr. Justice Frankfurter is the more re-
strained in upsetting governmental action.94 But as pointed out above,
rejected the theory of incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See p. 593 infra. Therefore, I suspect his heart was not in it when he assumed
the theory in Willie's case. See note 98 infra,
88. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
89. E.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
90. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
91. Id. at 89.
92. Id. at 90-1.
93. See p. 577 supra.
94. See CuRgis, LIONS UNDM THE THRONE, c. 16 (1947) ; Frank, The United States
Supremne Court: 1946-47, 15 U. or CHI. L. Ray. 1, 21 (1947).
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it is the extraneous factor of a belief in states' rights that causes 1r.
Justice Frankfurter to be more self-restrained.95 The significant point
is that as between the two theories as stated by the justices, the "spe-
cific" words approach is more difficult to manipulate verbally.
It is ironical, however, to compare the two approaches as if they were
definitive. Of the other seven present members of the Court, only Mr.
Justice Douglas appears wholeheartedly to accept either view. He con-
curs in Mr. Justice Black's dissent in the Adamson case. Mr. Justice
Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge somewhat ambiguously appear in
the same case to accept both approaches. They agree that the Bill
of Rights is included in the Fourteenth Amendment, but they do not
stop there. "Occasions may arise," they say, "where a proceeding falls
so far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as
to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due pro-
cess despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights." 13
In the Adamson case, the rest of the Court, after noting that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not incorporate the Bill of Rights in toto,
says that the issue is "whether the comment on failure to testify vio-
lates the protection against state action that the due process clause
does grant to an accused." 91 There follows a long discussion citing
Supreme Court cases, state cases, treatises, and law review articles.
The conclusion is that the Due Process Clause was not violated. Why
that conclusion is drawn is not clear."
CONCLUSION
Here is a great quantity of sound and fury signifying what? Two
present members of the Court produce theories of constitutional inter-
pretation of governmental limitations designed to control themselves
and their brethren. 91 Each theory collapses, on analysis, into little
95. See pp. 587-8 supra.
96. 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947).
97. Id. at 54.
98. There is irony in the unsettled state of things. The present line-up is: Bill of
Rights not in-Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, JJ.; Bill of Rights
in-Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, JJ. If four of the former require one of the
latter to constitute a majority, he can force his theory to be assumed, as in the Willie
Fra cis case, see note 87 supra, or he can concur in the result and prevent a majority
opinion. Cf. Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947). The converse is partly true in
that if one of the majority joins the four dissenters the latter must either talk "due
process" or allow a separate concurrence preventing a majority opinion. See Malinshi v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). Thus, the controversy can be kept alive for some time.
99. I have discussed this problem of objectivity almost solely in ternms of the constitu-
tional issues of limitations on government. Although the problem stands out more
sharply here than in cases of distribution of power, either between state and nation or
within the Federal Government, the problem is not different in kind. See, for example,
Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. OF CHr L. RLv. 27, esp. pp. 28-31, 47-8
(1942).
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more than a front for policy-making. No justice can be controlled ex-
cept by tfhose limitations, absolute, physical, and self-imposed, dis-
cussed earlier. Perhaps Mr. Justice Frankfurter measures his power,
finds it precarious, and retreats. If so, that is the cause of the retreat,
not "society's opinion." Perhaps Mr. Justice Black is stymied by an
inability to maneuver around "specific" words. If so, it is a lack of
ingenuity, a fear of criticism, or a judgment of the reaction to the trans-
parency of his maneuver which stops him, not the "specific" words,
There is no objectivity in constitutional law because there are no
absolutes. Every constitutional question involves a weighing of com-
peting values. Some of these values are held by virtually everyone,
others by fewer people. Supreme Court justices likewise hold values.
The more widely held are the values in society, the more likely the
Supreme Court will hold them; the more controversial the values, the
more likely the Supreme Court is to divide over them. 10 It is also true,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter says, that Supreme Court justices are "freed
from the influences of immediacy and from the deflections of worldly am-
bition." 101 This enables them to hold to their values more consistenly
than lesser people more precariously situated. But in any event it is
their values which they seek to make effective. They may fail because
their power is limited and to that extent they may have to follow a
course more in line with the values held by others; but they will do so
only because their power is limited, not because they accept other
values.
Hence the justice who wants to tell the world how he decides cases
must do what Chief Justice Stone did in a limited way and what Mr.
Justice Black almost by accident did in a less limited way. He must
say: "This is what I believe is important in our civilization and I shall
do all I can to preserve it." And forthwith set forth his creed. 2 If
this is too shocking to society or if the many limitations on the Court's
power are not in themselves believed to be sufficient to restrain the
imposition of "idiosyncratic" values, then society must take away the
Court's power. There is no middle ground.
100. "The division of opinion among the judges of the Supreme Court finds its counter-
part in the differences among those who debate in other forums. . . . Take a sampling
from the men you talk with at the club and in the Pullman and you will find that their
untrained common sense leads them to the same diverse conclusions to which the more
highly developed instrument leads the judges." Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Con-
stitutional Law, 15 JoURNAL OF PHIL., PSYCH. AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 645, 647 (1918)
reprinted in 1 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 474, 476-7 (1938).
101. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 665 (1943).
102. See RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH (1947).
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